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11 Introduction*
Mozambique entered the new millennium as the fastest growing country in the
world.1   After a devastating civil war, peace and reforms set the stage for recovery,
and the economy has grown by 6 percent annually on average during the 1990s.  This
has brought visible improvements to the performance of the economy and to social
indicators, which in turn contribute to investor confidence and maintain the
momentum for growth and investment.2
Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal in 1975. The independence
movement, Frelimo, introduced a socialist system and very ambitious development
objectives shortly thereafter.  A ten-year perspective plan was introduced in 1977 with
the objective to end underdevelopment.  The proposed policy measures were rapid
industrialization based on the agricultural surplus that would emerge from rapid
modernization.  The state would allocate resources and coordinate the modernization
process (Abrahamsen and Nilsson 1995).   Initially the program was met with
considerable success as far as social indicators were concerned and modest success in
economic development; achieving strong export growth and moderate economic
growth. 3
However, the country was soon plunged into a devastating civil war that was fuelled
by both local conflicts and the cold war.  In particular, South Africa supported the
rebel Renamo forces and led a policy aiming at destabilizing the country
economically and politically.4  The war lasted for about two decades and left the
country the poorest in the world when the war came to an end in 1992.  Social,
economic and physical infrastructure was devastated and the economy had largely
resorted to subsistence production and barter trade.
In spite of the war, Mozambique introduced an Economic Recovery Program (ERP)
supported by the IMF in 1987.  The basic elements of the program were stabilization
of the economy and reforms, notably liberalization of external and internal trade and
privatization.
The first free elections were held in 1994, and the newly elected president and
government soon embarked on a comprehensive recovery program, which can be seen
as a continuation of the 1987 ERP.  The program contained market liberalization,
trade liberalization, public sector reform, investments in infrastructure rehabilitation
and social sector programs focused on primary education and primary health care; and
privatization of state-owned enterprises.  The recovery program has been remarkably
successful and the country has seen an annual average economic growth rate of about
8 percent since 1994, substantial improvements in social indicators and an investment
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1 The Economist Intelligence Unit's forecast for the year 2000 at the beginning of the year.
2 The country experienced a serious setback in early 2000 due to devastating floods and tropical storms.
3 The annual average growth rate was about 2.8 percent during the period 1977-81, while exports grew
by 15 percent annually during the same period.  The number of teachers doubled, the illiteracy rate
declined from 93 to 70 percent and health indicators improved substantially.
4 Renamo was initially formed as a counter-revolutionary force by the then Rhodesian intelligence
service.
2boom involving both local and foreign investors.  The recovery program is even seen
as a model for post-war rehabilitation and economic reform.
The vigorous recovery has, however, aggravated serious macroeconomic imbalances
in the economy.  The country has always had a current account deficit, and the
government budget has also been in deficit for extended periods of time.  During the
1990s both these deficits have widened to about 20 percent of GDP.  The country is
extremely aid dependent, with development aid accounting for between 30 and 40
percent of GDP during the first half of the 1990s, declining to around 10 percent of
GDP thereafter.  When such large inflows of aid are used for investment and later
complemented by foreign direct investment, the observed boom in economic activity
is not surprising.  In the absence of a local capital goods industry, an import boom
should also be expected.  Recent growth rates will, however, only be sustainable if the
investments generate output for exports or replacing imports in the future.
This paper presents an analysis of the foreign direct investment flows to Mozambique
during the 1990s.  Section 2 provides an overview of economic development during
the 1990s including industrial structure, the balance of payment and economic policy.
Foreign direct investment flows are analyzed in detail in section 3.  We report data
from the IMF, local sources and the Business Map database.  The data analysis
constitutes the foundation for identifying the key determinants of FDI in Mozambique
and the theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of FDI on the economy.  The
determinants of FDI are further discussed in section 4, while the impact of FDI on the
economy is discussed in section 5.  Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Economic development
2.1 Resources and economic structure
 Mozambique has a population of about 17 mill. and a GDP per capita of about USD
100.5   Compared to the least developed countries, Mozambique used to have a
relatively large industrial base.  Industrialization started in the 1960s, and was largely
based on local raw materials from agriculture and forestry.  By 1973 manufacturing
had reached a level accounting for 40 percent of GDP, but since independence the
sector has declined sharply both in relative and absolute terms (Abrahamson and
Nelson 1995).  Thus, in 1996 industry accounted for about 20 percent of GDP of
which manufacturing accounted for about half, agriculture accounted for about 35
percent and services 45 percent (World Bank 1999).
Mozambique’s location makes it a natural regional service center.  During the
colonial period exports of services to the region accounted for 50 percent of foreign
exchange earnings.  Of these, half came from migrant workers to the South African
mines, while the other half came from railway and port charges. South Africa had
agreed to utilize the railway between Transvaal and Maputo in return for having
access to a pool of Mozambican labor (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995).  The second
half of foreign exchange earnings came from exports of raw materials from the
agricultural sector.  The raw materials were mostly exported to Portuguese
manufacturing industries, while some of the earnings from migrant labor went directly
                                                                
5 World Bank estimate using the Atlas method of converting income data from local currency to a
common (dollar) currency.  The Atlas method uses a three year average nominal exchange rate
adjusted for inflation differences between the country in question and the G5 countries (France,
Germany, Japan, UK, US).
3to Portugal in the form of gold.  The practice of paying the country for mine workers
in gold came to an end shortly after independence, while transit trade was sabotaged
by South Africa and the rebel movement.  After new governments had taken office in
both Mozambique and South Africa, transit trade was revitalized, while migrant labor
declined, at least the legal part of it.  As will be seen below, the economic links
between the two countries have strengthened substantially over the past few years.
Mozambique is rich in natural resources.  Among the resources that are at present
underutilized are arable land, natural gas, mineral resources and the country has a
great potential for hydropower, and thus cheap energy. 6  The country is, however,
very poor in other crucial inputs in the production of goods and services, such as
infrastructure and skilled labor.  This is largely a legacy from the colonial era when
Portuguese settlers controlled most formal sector economic activity with very little
involvement of the local population.  Moreover, not only did 185 000 of a total of 200
000 settlers leave the country during the transition to an independent country, they
also sabotaged property and productive infrastructure.  This dealt a heavy blow to the
manufacturing sector, which was built around Portuguese management and workers.
Table 2.1 below gives an indication of the resource base in the country in the mid
1990s.
Table 2.1: Resource endowments
Indicator Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa
School enrolment ratios
  Primary 60 77 131
  Secondary 7 27 94
  Tertiary 1 3 19
Adult illiteracy rate (male) 47 34 18
Average years of schooling (male) 4 na 12
Life expectancy at birth (male) 44 51 62
Population density 20 25 30
Infrastructure
 Paved roads (percentage of total) 18.7 17 41.5
 Normalized road index* 141 107.1 300
 Telephone lines per 1000 people 3 16 107
 Cost of local call $ per 3 minutes 0.04 0.09 0.07
 Electric power consumption per
capita (kwh)
76 439 3719
Average years of schooling data are from 1992.  All other data are from 1996.
* Normalized road index is the total length of roads in a country compared with the expected
length of roads, where the expectation is conditioned on population, population density, per capita
income, urbanization, and region-specific dummy variables. A value of 100 is "normal." If the index is
more than 100, the country's stock of roads exceeds the average.
Source: World Bank (1999)
This composition of resource endowments suggests that Mozambique has a
comparative advantage relative to both South Africa and the sub-Saharan African
region in industries that use land intensively, as the country has the lowest population
density in the sample.  Not only is the land area per person larger in Mozambique,
land is also fertile and rich in minerals.  Mozambique also has a long coastline with
unspoiled beaches and coral reefs, ideal for tourism and rich fisheries.  The country is
                                                                
6 There are about 36 mill. hectars of arable land of which only a third is utilized (SADC/World
Economic Forum 1999).
4fairly well off in terms of transport infrastructure compared to the region, although the
country lags far behind South Africa.  In spite of very scarce telecommunications
networks, prices of telecommunication services are relatively low, indicating that
consumers are heavily subsidized.  Finally, the country is very poor in human capital
both relative to the region and to South Africa.
The comparably low consumption of electric power in Mozambique does not reflect
the country’s power generation capacity, but is instead an expression of the low level
of  per capita income.  Mozambique has in fact ample electricity generation capacity,
but the transmission lines go to South Africa who used to be the major customer of
the power sector.  The transmission lines were damaged during the war, but in spite of
recent rehabilitation, exports have not resumed due to disagreement over prices.7
Electricity consumption is, however, expected to increase dramatically when an
aluminium smelter plant under construction becomes operational  (see section 3.1).
Furthermore, several other energy-intensive investment projects are in the pipeline,
attracted by Mozambique's ample and relatively cheap electricity.
The figures presented in table 2.1 indicate that Mozambique probably has a
comparative advantage in agriculture and energy-intensive industries, but a huge
comparative disadvantage in skill-intensive industries, both compared to South Africa
and to the region as a whole. We do not have data on capital stock per worker for
Mozambique, but it can be safely assumed that it is significantly lower than in South
Africa, and thus a comparative disadvantage relative to South Africa for capital-
intensive industries.  Estimates of investment expenditure differ widely depending on
the sources of data.  We have chosen to use the IMF International Financial Statistics
data.  Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP compared to South Africa and
Africa as a whole is depicted in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1  Gross fixed capital formation as share of GDP
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7 The South African electricity company, Eskom, is one of the world's lowest cost producers of
electricity and is not willing to pay more than the cost of its own electricity.  Besides Eskom has excess
capacity.
5The figure first illustrates one of Africa’s development problems; a low rate of gross
fixed capital formation.  For comparison, the newly industrialized countries in Asia
had gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratios between 30 and 45 percent during the
period from the late 1980s to 1997.8  South Africa suffers from the same problem as
the average African country in this respect.  Mozambique, in contrast, exhibits a very
high investment rate.  Not only is it way above the average for Africa, it is also much
higher than the Asian newly industrialized countries.  In fact, Mozambique had a rate
of gross fixed capital formation about 1.75 times higher than Asian NICs such as
Malaysia and Korea during the 1990s.  If investments were equally effective in terms
of generating income, they should also lead to increases in income about 1.75 times
the increases in the NICs.9  Mozambique’s growth rate was, however, lower than
Malaysia and Korea on average during the period 1990-97.10  This does not
necessarily mean that investments are much less effective in Mozambique. Since a
large share of gross fixed capital formation has been in infrastructure and large-scale
projects with a long gestation period (see section 3 below), growth may well pick up
to two-digit figures as the new projects come on stream.
On the basis of Mozambique’s level of income, its resource base and its geography,
the country should have great potential for future growth.  First, the country starts
from a very low base and merely moving to the production possibility frontier given
its present resources, would probably imply a significant improvement in income per
capita.  Second, the recent investment boom has increased production capacity
substantially.  Finally, recent investments in large-scale projects promise significant
export earnings once the plants become operative, easing foreign exchange constraints
on future investments.
2.2 International trade and non-investment financial flows
The reforms introduced after the elections in 1994 envisaged a rapid transformation
from a planned economy to a market economy.  The transition was strongly supported
by the international donor community.  A rapid recovery followed, but it has
aggravated an already chronic external and internal macroeconomic imbalance.11
Twin deficits on the government budget and the current account to the tune of 20
percent of GDP have emerged.  Figure 2.2 depicts the current account deficit in terms
of USD since 1980.
                                                                
8 Investments fell sharply during the Asian financial crisis in 1998.
9 Taking the logarithms and time derivatives of a standard Cobb Douglas production function, we get
that increases in aggregate income equal the weighted average of increases in capital and labor where
the weights are each factor’s share in national income, plus the change in total factor productivity.  If
the countries included in the comparison have the same factor shares in GDP and the same rate of total
factor productivity growth, the changes in income should reflect the weighted average of changes in
employment and investment.  It is one of Kaldor’s stylized facts that factor shares are constant over
time and between countries.  Total factor productivity does, however, vary widely among countries.
10 Mozambique’s growth rate was about 6 percent per annum on average during the period 1990-97,
while the corresponding figures for Malaysia and Korea were 8.7 and 7.3 respectively.
11 The country never had a current account surplus during the period 1958-74 (Abrahamsen and
Nilsson 1995) and during the period 1980- 1996 (IMF 1999).  Data for the period 1975-79 is not
available)
6Figure 2.2: Current account deficit and exports of goods and services
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As can be seen from the figure, the current account deficit before grants is higher than
total exports of goods and services during the entire period.  However, the current
account deficit after grants has narrowed somewhat between 1994 and 1997 as
exports picked up, only to widen again in 1998, mainly due to imports of capital
goods for large-scale investment projects.  Table 2.2 shows the composition of
exports and imports in 1997.
Table 2.2 International trade, 1997, USD mill.
Exports Imports
Consumer goods 124.99 148.70
   Food 115.43 80.02
   Other 9.56 68.68
Intermediate goods 93.97 270.42
  Basic 46.81 70.22
  Processed 47.16 200.20
Equipment 9.70 252.68
  Transport material 2.73 118.49
  Other 6.97 134.19
Fuel and electricity 1.32 88.36
Others 0.09 0.04
Total 230.07 760.20
 Source: National Institute of Statistics
The most important single exports are prawns, cashew, cotton, sugar, maize and
wood.  It is first worth noticing that the trade patterns largely reflects the comparative
advantage derived from the country’s resource endowments presented in table 2.1.
Second, export earnings account for less than a third of the import bill.  A final
important point is that Mozambique’s exports of services are actually larger than its
merchandise exports.  According to IMF (2000) statistics, exports of services
7amounted to USD 278.7 in 1997 and USD 286.2 in 1998.12  Service trade is better
balanced than merchandise trade, and reflects Mozambique’s position as a transit
route, source of migrant labor and a tourist destination.  Merchandise exports in
nominal dollar terms grew by about 9.5 percent annually on average during the period
1992-98, significantly faster than GDP.
Turning to the direction of trade, Asia was the most important destination of exports
in 1991, accounting for 57 percent of the total.  Within Asia, Hong Kong, Singapore
and China were the most important export destinations.  During the 1990s the relative
importance of Asia and developing countries as a group has declined.  This reflects an
absolute decline in export value to developing countries while exports to the OECD
countries have been stable in dollar terms.  By 1997 the OECD countries received
about 60 percent of Mozambique’s exports.  Within the group of developing countries
there has been a remarkable shift in the direction of exports towards Africa.  During
the 1990s, exports to Africa have tripled in dollar terms and exports to neighboring
South Africa have increased 7-fold.  Exports to South Africa accounted for about 13
percent of Mozambique’s total exports in 1997 (IMF 1999).
When it comes to sources of imports, the relative importance of developing countries
has increased from 41 percent in 1991 to 75 percent in 1997.  Industrial countries
have lost market shares mainly to South Africa which has tripled its exports to
Mozambique in dollar terms and increased its market share from 22 percent to 50
percent (IMF 1999).13  Recent changes in the direction of trade are probably a result
of the reintegration of South Africa into the world economy.  South Africa became a
member of Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1994 and thus
enjoys privileged access to the Mozambican market in addition to its natural
comparative advantage as a neighboring country.
Due to substantial capital inflows in addition to the transfers depicted in figure 2.2,
the local currency appreciated sharply in real terms during the early 1990s,
particularly towards the South African rand.  Figure 2.3 depicts the real exchange rate
towards the US dollar and the South African rand during the 1990s.14
                                                                
12 Imports of services amounted to 328.6 and 401.2 mill. USD in 1997 and 1998 respectively.
13 According to local statistics, the South African share of total imports was about 40 percent in 1997
(National Institute of Statistics, 2000).
14 Estimates using Laspeyres formula.
8Figure 2.3: Real exchange rate index
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The local currency, the Meticais, appreciated sharply towards both dollars and rand
during the period 1990-92, reflecting increases in foreign aid, FDI, and “exceptional
financing.”15  The exchange rate has, however, been stable in real terms towards the
rand and depreciated towards the dollar in recent years.  We find a positive correlation
between the current account deficit and the real exchange rate (when the exchange
rate depreciates, the current account deficit narrows), indicating that the external
balance is sensitive to movements in the exchange rate, and that this may partly
explain the widening external imbalance during the economic recovery. 16  The major
explanation for the widening current account balance is, however, imports of capital
goods related to the investment boom.
The recent development of the Mozambique economy in general and the FDI flows in
particular can not be fully understood without assessing the role of the so-called
development corridors.  We therefore discuss them at some length and detail in the
next section.
2.3 The three Development  corridors
As mentioned above, transit trade was one of Mozambique’s most important sources
of foreign exchange earnings during the colonial era.  About 40 percent of Gauteng’s
industrial exports went through the Maputo corridor before 1975 (Driver and De
Barros 1999).  The route was, however, more or less closed from the mid 1970s to the
early 1990s, and the South African ports of Durban and Richards Bay took over as the
                                                                
15 “Exceptional financing” is an item below the overall balance line on the balance of payment account
that captures debt rescheduling, debt forgiveness and arrears related to foreign debt servicing.
16 We find a correlation coefficient of 0.57 between the real exchange rate towards USD and the current
account balance, the corresponding figure against the rand is 0.5 both with the current account lagged
one year.  This result is only tentative since we have a short and not terribly reliable time series data.
9major trading ports both for Gauteng and landlocked neighboring countries.  In
addition to the Maputo corridor, there were two other major transit routes, the Beira
corridor between Harare and Beira; and the Nacala corridor between Lilongwe,
Lusaka and Nacala.
Revitalizing these transit routes has been an important part of Mozambique’s
development strategy.  However, the objectives have been more ambitious than just to
reestablish transit routes.  Rather it has been envisaged that the provision of efficient
infrastructure would “crowd in” productive investments and trigger a process of
agglomeration of industries and supply networks.  This development policy coincided
with South Africa’s strategy of spatial development initiatives (SDIs), which aimed at
boosting economic activities in less developed regions of the country. 17  Three of
these SDIs have a regional dimension, and the Maputo corridor is the flagship among
them (Driver and de Barros 1999).
South Africa and Mozambique struck an agreement in 1995 to re-establish the
Maputo corridor.  The infrastructure in the corridor consists of a toll road, a railway
link, telecommunication networks, a border post and the port of Maputo.  All this
infrastructure existed before the project was initiated, but needed substantial
rehabilitation and upgrading.  The telecommunication network, for example, is being
upgraded by a digital microwave system. The border post is planned as a 24-hour one-
stop post.  When operational, it will reduce processing time at the border from 2-6
hours at present to less than an hour.
The Maputo corridor project entails a first experiment with public-private
partnerships.  The toll-road between Witbank and Maputo is thus a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) scheme on a 30-year concession awarded to a private international
consortium.18  Construction started on the South African side in 1997.  The road will
have five plazas, three on the South African side and two on the Mozambican side. It
is the first in Southern Africa that is designed to cover the full cost of investment and
maintenance from toll payments.  The South African stretch was opened in 1998,
while the Mozambican leg is planned finalized in 2001.
The Maputo port project includes several specialized terminals for different cargo.
They have been privatized or partly privatized, and this has been an important source
of foreign direct investment.  Thus, the terminals handling exports from landlocked
neighboring countries are run by companies from those countries, while South
African/ multinational companies such as the Rennies Group and P&O have
participated in the development of the container terminal.
The Maputo Corridor Company was formed in order to oversee the implementation of
the Maputo corridor project.  Its ownership structure is 65 percent private ownership
and the remaining 35 percent shared between 5 governments (Mozambique, South
Africa, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe).  Hence, not only is the project a
cooperation between the private and public sectors, it also has a regional inter-
government dimension.
                                                                
17 See also Nordås (2000b).
18 The consortium is Trans Africa Concessions (Mitchell 1998).
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The Maputo corridor project has not been without problems, however.  The toll fees
on the South African side of the road appear to be so high that transporters avoid the
route and choose other alternatives.  Thus, since the toll plazas opened, heavy vehicle
traffic has declined by close to 50 percent (Driver and de Barros 1999).  A related
problem is that freight is largely going in one direction, from Gauteng to Maputo,
with small opportunities for backhaul.  Returning empty of course increases the cost
of transport tremendously compared to the more crowded routes to Durban or other
ports.
Recent developments in the shipping industry towards larger vessels and fewer calls
on ports limit the development of Maputo harbor as an export-import port.  For this, it
is too close to Durban, which already has the necessary facilities and an established
position as a hub port.  Maputo can therefore realistically only expect to become a
prominent feeder port for Durban as far as container transport is concerned.  It can,
however expand its capacity as a bulk port.
Upgrading of the railway link grinded to a halt as negotiations between the bidder for
the project (the South African railway parastatal Spoornet) broke down in 1999.
Finally, privatization of general port services ran into difficulties, because the
preferred bidder wants to see an agreement on the railway link before making a
commitment, underscoring how interrelated these projects are and the need for
coordination.
So far, the three development corridors have not attracted the freight that was hoped
for.  Hence, much transit transportation from landlocked neighboring countries
continues to go through South Africa in spite of shorter routes through Mozambique.
This is probably due to the fact that the road and port facilities are still under
rehabilitation, and due to lack of efficient and integrated transportation services such
as road vehicle workshops along the route, which can take care of technical problems
and vehicle brake down quickly and effectively.  The experience of the Maputo
corridor so far also raises the question of scale efficiency in BOT infrastructure
investment projects, both for the BOT investors and the users of the toll-road.
Initial problems notwithstanding, the Maputo corridor has attracted substantial interest
from private investors.  Private investment in the corridors have been further
stimulated by the establishment of industrial development zones along the route,
offering a package of investment incentives on the condition that the investor exports
at least 85 percent of output.  A number of large-scale investment projects has been
suggested, and some of them have materialized and are under construction in early
2000.  These are discussed further in section 3.
2.4 Unbalanced growth
Mozambique is rich in natural resources, which hitherto have been largely
unexploited.  The rapid growth during the post-war period has been driven by aid-
funded recovery of physical, economic and social infrastructure.  Nevertheless,
medium-term growth is based on large-scale natural resource-intensive investments
that create few jobs and few backward and forward linkages, but substantial foreign
exchange earnings.19  The latter is yet to materialize and meanwhile substantial
                                                                
19 The industrialization pattern is similar to Norway’s in the early 20th century with the establishment of
large-scale aluminum smelter plants based on access to cheap hydropower, while importing the raw
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macroeconomic imbalances have been sustained and even widened during the 1990s.
The current account imbalance will most likely narrow as exports come on stream, but
the government budget balance will remain a problem in the face of ambitious
development programs and very low taxes on the most important income-generating
sectors of the economy (see section 3 below). In addition, the development path
Mozambique has embarked on entails the danger of running into Dutch disease type
problems.20  The problem arises when exports of natural resource-based goods lead to
an appreciation of the exchange rate and thereby renders labor-intensive
manufacturing uncompetitive.
As the discussion on the development corridors demonstrates, Mozambique’s
economic development is closely linked to that of South Africa.  It may be sustained
due to relocation of energy- and labor-intensive South African industries partly
servicing the South African market and partly South African multinational
companies’ demand for raw materials and other intermediate inputs. In that sense,
Mozambique is in a similar position as Mexico after the formation of NAFTA,
although the income gap between Mozambique and South Africa is larger than the
income gap between Mexico and the US.21  However, while Mexico integrated with a
booming neighboring economy, South Africa is still struggling to get growth and
development off the ground, and will probably continue to do so for some time to
come.22
3 Foreign direct investment flows
The Mozambican government has encouraged foreign investment since 1985 when
the first law on foreign investment was introduced.  It was replaced in 1993 by a new
law that applies to local and foreign investment alike and ensures national and equal
treatment of local and foreign investors in most areas.  In addition, the investment law
grants foreign investors protection of property rights and repatriation of profits.
Mozambique is a member of MIGA, OPIC, and ICSID. 23 Finally, a one-stop agency,
the Investment Promotion Centre, has been established in order to undertake timely
assistance and authorization of investment projects (Mozambique Government 2000).
A number of investment incentives have been introduced.  Among them are tax
holidays; duty free imports of intermediates (or significant rebates on duties); a liberal
regime related to repatriation of profits and employment of expatriates.  Expenses on
training of local employees can be deducted from profits before tax.  Fiscal incentives
are more favorable in remote regions in order to compensate investors for higher costs
in areas with inadequate infrastructure and supply chains.  Finally, as mentioned
above, the government introduced export processing zones (industrial free zones, IFZ)
                                                                                                                                                                                         
materials and exporting raw aluminium.  Moreover, fisheries and tourism were other important pillars
in the development of the Norwegian economy.
20 The impact of large inflows of foreign exchange is discussed in Auty and Mikesell (1998) and
Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), both in the context of exports of minerals.  Nordås and Gergis (2000)
argue that these analyses are highly relevant to large inflows of development aid as well.
21 Income per capita in Mexico was about 13 percent of that in the US in 1996, while Mozambique’s
income per capita was only about 2 percent of South Africa’s.
22 See Nordås (2000b).  Here it is argued that optimism as far as South Africa’s growth potential is
concerned underestimates the damage the apartheid system did to the country.  This damage can simply
not be undone in a few years, no matter how good policies the country adopts.
23 MIGA: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, OPIC: Insurers against non-commercial risk
International Convention and ICSID: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
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in relation to three development corridors.  Inside these zones there are full exemption
from customs duties, consumption and circulation taxes and customs handling fees for
investment and intermediate goods, and only a very small tax on income (Government
of Mozambique 2000).  To qualify for IFZ status, a company must export at least 85
percent of its output and a minimum investment of USD 50 000 is required.  An
additional advantage for foreign investors exporting products manufactured in
Mozambique to third countries is that Mozambique is eligible for duty-free export
quotas to the European Union, the US and other developed countries under the
General System of Preferences (GSP).  Mozambique also enjoys preferential low-duty
export quotas to the Eastern and Southern African markets under COMESA, and has a
special trade agreement with South Africa.   In spite of the liberal investment policy,
there are still investment barriers such as excessive red tape, de facto local partnership
requirements, import controls and corruption (IDC 1997).
Figure 3.1 depicts the flow of foreign direct investment during the period 1987 to
1998 in USD (left hand scale) and as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation
(right hand scale).
Figure 3.1: Foreign direct investment
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We note that the FDI that has actually materialized is modest compared to total fixed
capital formation, which in turn is largely financed through development aid.  Thus,
the period between 1994 and 1998 has been characterized by public investment in the
recovery of infrastructure, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and planning and
negotiations with multinational companies on the implementation of large-scale
investment projects.  These investment projects have materialized only recently, as
the quadrupling of FDI in 1998 indicates.
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Turning to a more detailed break down of FDI, we use data from Business Map.24
They provide investment data by projects, where country of origin of the investor, the
receiving sector, the year of investment and the type of investment are reported.  In
addition, the investing company and its local partner are identified.  Let us start by
analyzing the country of origin of the investors.  The most significant investor
countries are reported in figure 3.2, while smaller investor countries are aggregated
into regions.  The value of investments is reported at current USD (the left hand axis)
and the number of projects is shown on the right hand axis.
Figure 3.2: Foreign direct investment by country of origin
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The largest investor is “International,” representing two large-scale projects.  The first
is the major project in the Maputo corridor, namely the Mozal aluminium smelter
plant with investment of about 1.3 bill. USD. The participants are Billiton, a London-
listed South African mineral company, and Mitsubishi, a Japanese conglomerate.  In
addition, the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), a state-owned
development finance institution, participates with equity financing.  Construction
started in 1998 and is expected to be completed by the end of year 2000.  The second
international project is a cooperation by Eskom, the South-African state-owned
electricity-company, and Swaziland Electricity Board.  This investment is in
electricity generation mainly for exports to Swaziland and South Africa. When the
South African share of these projects is included, reckoning Billiton as a South
African company, South Africa accounts for about 60 percent of total accumulated
investments.
The second largest investor in Mozambique is its former colonial power, Portugal.
Even though Portugal is an insignificant foreign investor on a global scale, it has a
                                                                
24 Business Map is a private company which compiles a comprehensive database for FDI flows in the
SADC area.  Its data are based on company annual reports, central banks statistics, newspaper articles
and interviews.
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prominent presence in Mozambique, indicating that familiarity with the country and
cultural ties matter.  Thus, a common language and knowledge of culture, customs,
and knowledge of the economic geography of the country probably reduces the costs
of acquiring reliable information and other transaction costs.  This argument applies
to neighboring South Africa as well, perhaps even more so than Portugal.  Portuguese
investments are probably also driven by returning businesses after the exodus at
independence.
Turning to sectoral composition of FDI, figure 3.3 shows that the dominant industries
hosting FDI are energy-and land-intensive industries.  These produce mainly for
exports, and reflect Mozambique’s comparative advantage in these sectors, as also
indicated by trade flows.
Table 3.1: FDI by sector
Value of projects,
USD mill.
Number of projects
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 150.1 10
Chemicals, Plastics and Rubber products 2.0 1
Construction Building materials and engineering 12.5 5
Energy and oil 135.5 2
Financial services 36.0 6
Food, beverages and Tobacco 290.8 14
Hotel, leisure and gaming 39.9 10
Media, Print and publishing 2.4 2
Metal products and mineral beneficiation 1320.8 2
Mining and quarrying 6.9 3
Motor and Components 2.7 2
Other Manufacturing 35.0 1
Retail and Wholesale 23.6 4
Transport and Transport Equipment 9.1 1
Total 2067.3 63
Source: Business Map
Investments in sectors such as financial services and construction are largely
investments supporting the resource-intensive industries and are dominated by South
Africa and Portugal.  In the financial sector 4 out of 6 projects are Portuguese.  FDI in
retail and wholesale trade represents a regional expansion of South African retail
chain stores.
The second largest sector in terms of number of projects is “Hotels, leisure and
gaming.”  This is, according to SADC/World Economic Forum (1999), one of the
most promising sectors in Mozambique.  The country has a 2 500 km coast line with
unspoiled beaches, islands and coral reefs.  In addition there is great scope for
gaming.
The two largest investors, South Africa and Portugal differ in their sectoral profile of
investments.  South Africa dominates the metal products (including its part in the
international projects), agriculture, retail sales and hotels sectors, while Portugal has a
leading role in financial services and food processing.  Portugal’s leading role in
financial services is perhaps surprising, given that South Africa has internationally
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competitive financial enterprises with a substantial international branch network, and
South Africa is believed to have an advantage in African banking services due to its
long-standing experience from doing business in Africa (Nordås 2000b). 25
Finally, we look at different categories of investment as classified by the Business
Map database.  It distinguishes between, green-field investments, joint ventures,
privatization and mergers and acquisitions (M&A).26  As one would expect in a
capital-poor and war-torn country such as Mozambique, green-field investments
dominate.  The structure of FDI along the type dimension does, however, stand in
sharp contrast to global trends in FDI where M&A dominates (UNCTAD 1999,
OECD 1999).  FDI by category is depicted in figure 3.3, which shows the value of
investments.
Figure 3.3: Investment by type
Expansion
9 %
Joint venture
4 %
New
78 %
Mergers and acquisition
4 %
Privatization
5 %
Source: Business Map
To summarize the trends in FDI, we see, first, that recent and planned inflows of FDI
are large compared to Mozambique’s total economy.  Second, the FDI is largely
concentrated in natural resource intensive industries.  Fourth, South Africa and
Portugal dominate as foreign investors, South Africa concentrating on mineral
resource-intensive industries while Portugal concentrates on land-intensive industries.
Both are, however, involved in the service industries.  Finally, most investments are
new investments or extensions of existing ones, meaning that FDI leads to additional
production capacity and jobs.
Before we go on to discuss determinants of FDI, it is useful to take a closer look at the
largest FDI project undertaken in Mozambique to date, the Mozal project.  The
project accounts for almost 65 percent of total accumulated FDI up to the year 2000,
                                                                
25 South African banks have developed technology for servicing poor individuals with credit and
payments services at reasonable costs and South African insurance companies have developed
insurance for poor and even HIV-infected individuals.  In both cases the customers had previously no
access to such services.
26 Some of these are not mutually exclusive.
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and the value of investments is equal to about 80 percent of 1997 GDP, both
measured in nominal dollar terms.  It is also worth mentioning that an even bigger
smelter plant project is under planning.  This is an iron and steel production plant
where the investing company is the American energy and communication
multinational Enron.  Enron has already secured the rights to develop the Pande gas
field.  It plans to develop the field and pipe the gas to Maputo for fuelling the iron and
steel plant, the Mozal smelter and other customers in South Africa (through the power
grid from Maputo to South Africa).  This project will amount to more than USD 2
bill. if implemented (Business Map 2000).  So far, however, the project has been
delayed, among other things because of disputes over electricity market regulations.
3.1 The Mozal project
In March 1998 the government of Mozambique passed a decree legislating the
creation of an IFZ in Beloluane in the Maputo Corridor, near the Maputo harbor.  The
Mozal project is the first project inside the Beloluane IFZ, it is located about 17 km
from Maputo and is the anchor project in the Maputo Corridor SDI.  The production
capacity of the plant will be 250 000 tons when the first phase of the project is
completed, increasing to 500 000 tons after a planned second phase.  At the 1999
world market price of aluminium, the first phase capacity output will generate export
earnings around USD 430 mill. annually.  Compared to total merchandise export
earnings in 1998 of USD 248 mill., the Mozal project will more than double export
earnings.  The smelter plant will employ 800 persons, of which 700 will be
Mozambicans, while 9000 persons are employed during the peak of the construction
phase.
Equity is distributed among the investors as follows:  Billiton, the world’s fourth
largest producer of aluminium, holds 49 percent, Mitsubishi holds 26 percent and IDC
25 percent.  The Mozal project builds on Billiton’s technology, which is ranked
second in the world in terms of cost effectiveness.  The company has a similar smelter
plant in Richards Bay, South Africa (the Hillside smelter plant), and Mozal is built
over the same concept as the Hillside smelter.27
The Mozal project enjoys all the investment incentives offered investors in general
and investors in IFZs in particular.  Because of this, and the fact that the investors
already command state of the art technology, the Mozal plant is expected to become
one of the lowest-cost aluminium smelter plants in the world.  The Mozal plant
becomes part of Billiton’s global sales and supply chain network and will benefit
from Billiton’s R&D results and its access to international financial markets through
its London listing.  There are also synergies from operating both the Hillside and the
Mozal smelters.  Billiton will for example purchase inputs (alumina and petroleum
coke) for both plants simultaneously, ship them to Hillside and load off for the
Hillside plant while shipping the rest to Maputo. The ship is by then half-loaded and
can get into Maputo harbor.  In this way transport costs are reduced significantly for
the Mozal plant, and possibly also for the Hillside plant since larger vessels can be
used.  Nonetheless, the second phase of the project depends strongly on that the
planned dredging of the Maputo harbor is actually implemented. Trade in alumina is
intra-firm trade as the mineral is bought from Billiton’s mine in Australia.
                                                                
27 It is even built by the same team (Financial Mail 3 December 1999).
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The most crucial input in an aluminium smelter plant besides alumina is of course
electricity.  Electricity to Mozal comes from the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project
(in Mozambique), but it is routed through Swaziland and South Africa through the
South African parastatal company Eskom’s grid.28  Billiton buys electricity on a long
term contract where the price is linked to the world market price of aluminium.  This
may well entail hidden subsidies to the plant, particularly during commodity price
slumps.  Furthermore, due to excess capacity in Eskom, Billiton benefits from very
low electricity prices during the first six years of operations.
Although the MOZAL smelter plant is capital intensive with a capital labor ratio of
about  USD 1.6 mill. per worker, labor costs are still a significant part of operating
costs.  The average monthly wage in the manufacturing sector in South Africa was R
3823 for all workers and R 2307 for black workers in December 1997 (Statistics
South Africa 1999).  For comparison, the statutory monthly minimum wage in
Mozambique was 301 600 Meticais in 1997 (National Institute of Statistics, 2000),
which corresponds to about R 120.  Mozal pays more than the monthly minimum
wage since it employs workers with at least some industrial skills, but labor costs are
still very much lower in Mozambique than in South Africa.  It should, however, be
noticed that in order to ensure a core of employees with the necessary skills to operate
the plant in an effective manner, 200 workers were employed in late 1999 and
introduced to a training program of 35 000 man days at a cost of USD 5 mill.
(Financial Mail 3 December 1999).
To summarize this section, the Mozal plant is the largest investment in Mozambique
to date.  It is attracted by low-cost supply of electricity and reasonably good
infrastructure for transport of inputs and outputs.  The synergies with the investor’s
plant in South Africa and the regional approach to developing infrastructure are,
however, crucial for the investment decision.
3.2 FDI - Summary
Foreign direct investment in Mozambique is concentrated in the three development
corridors.  The most important motive for locating in Mozambique appears to be
access to natural resources, including a scenic coastline and wildlife attractive to
tourists.  Investments outside the resource-intensive sectors appear to be mostly in
enterprises supporting anchor projects in the development corridors, or supplying the
consumers employed in these projects.  Furthermore, FDI in Mozambique,
particularly South African investments in the country, contribute to a closer
integration of the South African and the Mozambican markets, including the markets
for consumer goods and services.
The Mozal project is a good example of projects integrating Mozambican and South
African markets.  It entails an integrated infrastructure servicing Billiton’s plants on
both sides of the border and an integrated supply and marketing network.  The
training costs undertaken by Billiton in order to operate a state of the art smelting
plant in Mozambique underscores how crucial human capital is for international
competitiveness.  Few foreign investors are willing to take on such training costs, and
large-scale plants enjoying resource rents are probably one of the few sectors that can
afford to do so.
                                                                
28 Eskom has significant excess capacity, which is why there has been difficulties related to the
agreement on exports of electricity from the Cahora Bassa project to South Africa.
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4 Determinants of Foreign direct investment
The modern theory of international production is complex and draws on a number of
areas of economic research, including trade theory, economic geography, the theory
of the firm, industrial organization and the theory of innovation. 29  The many
approaches are synthesized in John Dunning’s “eclectic paradigm of international
production.”  This is a framework for analysis rather than a theory per see, and we
find it a useful framework for identifying the determinants of FDI in Mozambique and
for choosing the most relevant theoretical framework for an in depth analysis.  Let us
therefore briefly sketch the framework:
There are three sets of conditions that determine the extent, form and pattern of
international production.  First, firms own assets that give them an advantage vis-a-vis
other firms in servicing a particular market.   These assets are of such a nature that
firms can not easily reap the full benefit by selling them in a market.  Examples of so-
called owner-specific assets are technology, managerial capacity, organization, a
marketing network, a supply chain or other similar assets that other companies can not
replicate at the same cost in a particular location.  Another dimension to ownership
advantages is whether they give the owner an advantage in terms of production costs
or whether they give the owner an advantage in the area of transaction costs. Second,
in order for FDI to take place, firms that possess ownership advantages must consider
it their best option to utilize these advantages themselves by establishing production
activities within their own organization across international boundaries rather than
selling or licensing the advantages to foreign firms.  This second condition is referred
to as the internalization advantage.  Given that a firm has ownership advantages and
internalization advantages, it will choose to invest in a certain location if it is
profitable to transfer some of the firm’s assets to a foreign location and combine them
with that location’s immobile factors of production or intermediate inputs.
We will analyze FDI in Mozambique in this context.  But since we do not have
detailed information on the investing companies’ owner-specific assets, we will
emphasize Mozambique’s location-specific assets and the assets that we can infer that
investing firms may have.
Mozambique’s location-specific assets are clearly its rich natural resources, including
minerals, energy (hydropower, coal, gas and perhaps oil), arable land, fisheries, and
potential for tourism.  The Mozal plant, for example is attracted by access to low-cost
energy as it imports its raw materials and exports its output.30  In addition, the country
has a relatively well-developed infrastructure in the east-west direction, linking the
country to the main industrial area in South Africa (Gauteng with Johannesburg and
Pretoria) and facilitating transit trade to the landlocked neighboring countries.  North-
south infrastructure is, however, poor and has prevented a more integrated domestic
market.  Furthermore, the poor condition of local infrastructure has probably held
back potential development in the agricultural sector in the north of the country.
Natural resources combined with access to cheap energy and easy transport of inputs
and outputs to world markets are probably the package that attracts foreign investors.
                                                                
29 See Tolentino (1993) for an extensive discussion.
30 The plant in other words exports embodied energy from hydropower resources.
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Lack of skilled labor and crucial infrastructure such as telecommunications does,
however, imply adjustment costs to foreign investors who have to incur significant
training costs and investment in infrastructure, as the Mozal case study clearly shows.
In addition, inefficient bureaucracy, corruption and the small local market may deter
foreign investors.
Resource-seeking FDI typically used to be vertical investments in upstream resource
extraction in order to secure access to essential inputs in downstream activities
(Dunning 1993).  Recent developments have changed that somewhat, as resource-
based multinationals increasingly focus on their core, upstream activities while
diversifying geographically. In Mozambique, resource-seeking investments are
typically horizontal in the sense that the investor operates similar plants in
Mozambique as he does elsewhere.  The motive appears to be cost-minimization
rather than securing scarce resources.
Turning to owner-specific assets, we largely confine the discussion to the Mozal
project where we have some details on the investor’s assets.  As already mentioned
Billiton is one of the world’s leading aluminum producers, commanding state of the
art technology.  Its Mozal plant replicates its other smelter plants, particularly the
Hillside smelter, which is located across the border at Richards Bay, South Africa.
Compared to other multinational aluminium producers, Billiton probably has an
advantage related to its experience with doing business in Africa.  Other studies have
found that third world multinationals typically possess the ability to transform first
world technology to the smaller scale and different circumstances found in developing
countries (Tolentino 1993).  Compared to potential local firms, Billiton has access to
international financial markets, marketing networks and an organization that
coordinates its global production system.
As always in studies on FDI, the most intriguing question relates to why the investing
company chooses to locate production in the host country rather than purchasing the
raw materials from local firms (resource-seeking investments), exporting to the
market (market-seeking FDI) or licensing production.  For resource-seeking
investment the answer is relatively easy in the Mozambican case.  There are few local
firms that have access to the necessary technology and capital to exploit the natural
resources in a cost-effective manner.  Resources would therefore probably lie
unexploited in the absence of multinational firms.  Furthermore, the natural resource
sectors typically extract resource rent, which of course attracts investment as long as
the expected return to such investments is higher than in alternative uses.  Investments
in tourism, particularly in hotels, are dominated by international hotel chains for
whom brand names are important.  Licensing is not uncommon in the sector, but in a
country with a weak human capital base and service infrastructure, it is probably seen
as better to maintain control over operations through FDI in order to keep up the
quality customers associate with the brand name.
To conclude this section, it appears that FDI in Mozambique is largely resource-
seeking and companies establish similar plants and activities in Mozambique as they
have established elsewhere.  The foreign affiliates appear to exploit Mozambique’s
comparative advantages and export most of their output.  The multinationals bring
financial resources, technology and organizational capabilities to Mozambique and
their Mozambican activities are integrated into the multinational companies’ regional
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or global supply chains and marketing networks.  This is particularly the case for
South African investments in Mozambique.  To what extent the assets the foreign
investors bring spill over to local companies and individuals, depends on the extent to
which foreign investments are integrated into the local economy.  This question is
discussed in the next section.
5 Impact of foreign direct investment
The pattern of FDI in Mozambique is similar to the global pattern of FDI in the early
20th century.  At that time developing countries received 2/3 of total FDI, while the
investors were companies from the colonial powers.  In 1914 the primary sector
received 55 percent of total FDI, railways 20 percent, manufacturing 15 percent and
trade and distribution services, public utilities and banking 10 percent (Dunning
1983).  The driving force for FDI then was backward integration in order to secure
access to raw materials while investments in secondary and tertiary sectors were
largely made in order to supply the primary sector projects with necessary inputs and
the workers involved with necessary consumer goods.
Empirical evidence suggests that growth and development from natural resource-led
investments tend to be more problematic than investments motivated by access to
cheap labor, see for example Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) and Nordås (2000a).  This
is due to the fact that the capital stock and the level of national income increase faster
than institutional capacity, human capital and social indicators.  Development easily
becomes uneven unless the country has a redistribution strategy in place that does not
foster corruption and distort incentives.   Resource-led growth also typically leads to
an appreciation of the exchange rate.  Together with rising income this increases the
cost level in the economy and limits the market opportunities for those outside the
booming sectors.  Problems related to exchange rate appreciation stemming from a
booming export sector are referred to as the Dutch disease, and there are signs of a
looming Dutch disease in Mozambique.
Large-scale, resource-intensive industries could in theory generate sufficient income
and hence domestic demand to support clusters of industries which constitute markets
for each other, as envisaged in the big push theories of development (Vernon 1966,
Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny 1989).  There are, however, few examples that this has
actually happened.  The impact of FDI in Mozambique is therefore most likely related
to the potential linkages to the rest of the economy from resource-seeking investments
and externalities.  Such linkages are local supply networks, access to infrastructure
that had probably not been built in the absence of such investments, and learning
externalities or technology transfers.  In addition exports from the resource-seeking
investments may contribute to lifting foreign exchange constraints to local capital
investments.  We discuss the impact of these aspects of FDI in Mozambique below.
5.1 Technology transfer
In large-scale, mature, natural resource-based industries such as aluminium and steel
smelters, technology is largely embodied in the machinery.  The technology is also
highly sector-specific, such that technology-spillovers to other sectors are not very
likely (Nordås 2000a).  The most significant potential technology spillovers from
these industries are therefore learning externalities related to work organization,
project administration and exposure to international business practices, not least
accessing modern supply networks.
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Resource-seeking investments in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and tourism apply
more flexible technologies that can more easily spill over to local firms in the same
sector and to other sectors in the economy.  There is for example scope for using more
labor-intensive technologies in these industries in labor-abundant developing
countries than the same industry uses in developed countries.  Third world
multinationals often have a comparative advantage compared to first world
multinationals in applying suitable technology to third world conditions (Tolentino
1993).    There is also more scope for moving up the value added chain in businesses
based on agricultural raw materials and fisheries.
5.2 Marketing networks
Raw materials are sold on competitive world markets, often on commodity exchanges
or bourses.  The largest investments in the Mozambique economy (the aluminium
smelter plant and other heavy industry projects) are therefore not dependent on
marketing networks, although they do benefit from access to supply networks for
intermediate inputs.
The story is, however, completely different for light consumer goods such as textiles
and garment.  Increasingly these industries are dominated by global production and
marketing networks led by the retailers (Gereffin 1998).  Unfortunately, Mozambique
has received very little foreign investments in such sectors.  In fact, there are no
investments in the textile, clothing and garment sectors registered in the Business
Map data base.  This probably indicates that although nominal labor costs are low in
Mozambique, unit labor costs may still be high due to low productivity.  Productivity
in turn depends on smooth production operations and few delays or stops because of
power cuts, telephones not working, intermediate inputs not arriving in time and so
on.  Access to infrastructure built in the development corridors will ease these
constraints and could crowd in “light” consumer goods industries if the Dutch disease
problems are contained.
5.3 Access to credit
Highly indebted poor countries such as Mozambique do not have access to
international capital markets because of their governments’ default on foreign
borrowing.  This in turn means that the country and its companies have no investment
ratings by the leading international credit rating companies.  They can therefore not
issue bonds abroad or borrow from foreign banks.  Multinational companies’
subsidiaries in Mozambique, in contrast, enjoy the same credit rating as their parent
company, and can therefore raise capital in international markets on favorable terms.
Local firms can of course raise capital from the local financial market but the
domestic credit market has hitherto been shallow.  Between 1978 and 1996 there was
only one commercial bank in Mozambique.  It was state-owned and credit allocation
was determined by the state planning system.  As indicated by figure 3.3, the period
after 1996 has seen a number of entries of foreign banks, often in cooperation with
local investors (Business Map 2000).  This has led to a substantial credit expansion to
the private sector, increasing in real terms by 44 percent in 1997 and 28 percent in
1998 and from 10.5 percent of GDP in 1996 to 14.2 percent of GDP in 1998 (IMF
2000).  This is still low in international comparison, but it appears that foreign
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investment in the financial sector has reversed a declining trend, as indicated in figure
5.1 below.
Figure 5.1: Credit to private sector
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Credit was distributed (percentage shares) among sectors as follows in 1998:
Agriculture 22, manufacturing 27, trade 25, transport 6, construction 5 and others 15
percent.  Note the large share of total credit going to domestic trade.  Most of this (93
percent) was working capital, which also accounted for almost 70 percent of total
credit in 1998, while the remaining 30 percent went to investment capital (National
Institute of Statistics 2000).  This means that domestic credit for investment purposes
was less than 5 percent of GDP in 1998.  Thus, although the decline in credit for
private investment was reversed after new financial institutions entered the market,
access to credit is probably still a constraint to local entrepreneurs.  Yet, we may
conclude that not only has FDI brought financial resources to the FDI projects, FDI in
the financial sector has also improved access to credit to local entrepreneurs.
5.4 Export processing zones and development
Experience with export processing zones is mixed.  The costs and benefits to the host
country largely depend on what policy regime the EPZ is compared to, and whether
one assumes that intermediate inputs are tradable or not.  If they are not tradable, Din
(1994) finds that EPZs in most cases increase the host country’s income through
creating a market for a local supply industry.    Johansson and Nilsson (1997) find a
positive relation between exporting processing zones and total exports in some
countries while the effect is insignificant or negative in others.  They argue that EPZs
are more likely to be successful if located close to a city, have good infrastructure and
is part of a liberal overall trade regime.  These results beg the question why the
country should establish EPZs instead of liberalizing trade across the board, however.
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South Korea, who did just that, did not exhibit any significant impact of EPZ on
export performance.  The countries in which EPZs had an estimated negative impact
on exports (Mexico and the Dominican Republic) ran an inward looking import
substitution policy outside the EPZs.  This study only addresses the impact of EPZs
on export performance.  A study on Sri Lankan EPZs (Jayanthakumaran and Weiss
1997) applies social cost-benefit analysis to estimate the overall benefit of the EPZ
and find that there is a significant net benefit.  The EPZs studied entail mainly textile
and clothing firms and the net benefits largely stem from wage earnings above the
shadow price of unskilled (female) labor.
In all studies referred to, the potential benefits from EPZs arise from linkages to the
local economy, increasing demand for locally produced intermediates, employing
workers at wages above their shadow wages and creating learning externalities and
access to world marketing networks.  If, on the other hand the EPZ remains an
enclave in the economy, the benefits are likely to be limited, if any.  If it in addition
uses local resources at a price below their shadow prices, the impact may well be
negative.
The Maputo corridor EPZ, with the Mozal project as the anchor, has hitherto created
few linkages to the rest of the economy.  Experience from similar initiatives in South
Africa indicates that large-scale, capital-intensive anchor projects do not generate
much linkages in the long run either, even in a relative advanced country.  The
Richards Bay SDI is a case in point.  This SDI is based around a modern harbor and
its anchor projects are 5 large-scale and capital-intensive mineral beneficiation plants.
The plants have performed well and are among South Africa’s largest exporters.
They have created a number of supporting industries, but mainly in the form of
branches of firms established elsewhere in South Africa.  The hoped for forward
linkages in the form of the establishment of downstream processing plants have not
materialized at all (Aniruth and Barnes 1998).  Thus, if the Maputo corridor follows a
similar pattern, much of the backward linkages may accrue to South African
companies exporting from the South African side of the border, while lack of
comparative advantage in more sophisticated downstream industries may prove to
prevent the establishment of forward linkages in Mozambique.
5.5 Infrastructure and development
Several studies have found a positive relation between investment in infrastructure
and economic growth.  Not only is infrastructure part of the aggregate capital stock
which increases domestic output, there are also significant externalities related to
infrastructure investments, which call for government interventions (Dasgupta 1999,
Rioja 1999).  Externalities are related to the fact that infrastructure has properties of a
public good.  There is, however the possibility of over-investment in infrastructure as
shown for example by Barro (1990).31  Hulten (1996), for example, argues that it is
not only how much infrastructure a country has that counts, but even more how well
infrastructure is used.  Wheeler and Mody (1993) find that the quality of infrastructure
is the most important explanatory factor of US FDI flows to developing countries.
Mozambique has made substantial investment in infrastructure largely related to the
development corridors where foreign companies are attracted by generous investment
                                                                
31 If the services flowing from government expenditure in Barro’s model is interpreted as services from
infrastructure stocks, which it is in Dasgupta (1999).
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incentive packages and good infrastructure.  This will give foreign investors access to
expensive infrastructure without paying any taxes.  This strategy of course begs the
question whether it fosters an efficient allocation of resources, in a situation where
rural feeder roads and north-south transport routes are in such a condition that the
substantial potential for agricultural development is underutilized because of
prohibitive transport costs.
6 Summary and conclusions
Mozambique is one of the fastest growing countries in the world.  Growth appears to
be driven by the following three factors:
· Growth takes place from a very low base, meaning that a few investments in
medium and large scale companies have a significant impact on national income;
· Foreign funds to the tune of 36 percent of GDP on average during the period
1994-98 have flown into the country;
· Liberalization of markets and regional integration.
Foreign direct investment has followed these positive developments with a lag,
indicating that FDI is attracted by growth and low costs of inputs rather than driving
the growth process.  In particular, access to vast natural resources, generous
investment incentives and a reasonably well developed infrastructure at least in the
location where investment is encouraged, have attracted large-scale mineral
processing plants and investments exploiting renewable resources such as arable land,
fisheries and eco-tourism.
The major challenge facing Mozambique as a recipient of substantial capital inflows
and large-scale capital investment are macroeconomic management, and a distribution
policy that ensures that the benefits from foreign capital inflows accrues to
Mozambique’s population.  This requires an industrial policy that ensure economic
development outside the IPZs; and social investments that keep social development in
pace with economic development.  Mozambique has a good record as far as social
development is concerned, but the country needs a much stronger economic and
institutional infrastructure in order to ensure that the development corridors will not
remain enclaves in the economy, and that a fair share of the resource rent is retained
in the country.
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Summary
ISSN 0804-3639
This paper analyzes and explains foreign direct investment
(FDI) in Mozambique. The country was one of the fastest
growing countries in the world during the second half of the
1990s, and FDI has followed growth with a lag. FDI is
dominated by South African and Portuguese companies, it is
concentrated in the Maputo corridor, and one major project,
an aluminium smelter plant, accounts for more than 60 per
cent of total accumulated FDI. The driving forces for FDI
appear to be access to natural resources, particularly cheap
energy, a reasonably well developed infrastructure and
regional economic integration. The most important direct
impact of FDI in Mozambique is export earnings, easing the
foreign exchange constraint on investments. Since the foreign
investments are concentrated in mature, capital-intensive
industries, job creation is limited and depends on the
development of backward linkages to the local economy.
